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The Paradox of Counterfactual Tolerance
Daniel Berntson
Counterfactuals are somewhat tolerant. Had Socrates been at least six feet tall, he need
not have been exactly six feet tall. Hemight have been a little taller—hemight have been
six one or six two. But while he might have been a little taller, there are limits to how
tall he would have been. Had he been at least six feet tall, he would not have been more
than a hundred feet tall, for example. Counterfactuals are not just tolerant, then, but
bounded.
This paper presents a surprising paradox: If counterfactuals are tolerant and
bounded, then we can prove a flat contradiction using natural rules of inference.
Something has to go then. But what?
1 Paradox
Planck lengths are incredibly small. You would quite literally need a billion trillion of
them just to span the diameter of a proton. Now consider Socrates who is, we can
suppose, exactly five feet tall. For all 𝑛, let 𝑠𝑛 be the claim that Socrates is at least 𝑛
Planck lengths tall. We then claim that:
Tolerance: For all 𝑛, 𝑠𝑛  𝑠𝑛+1.
Boundedness: There are 𝑛 < 𝑚 such that had 𝑠𝑛  ¬𝑠𝑚.
Heights: For all 𝑛, 𝑠𝑛+1  𝑠𝑛.
Tolerance says that had Socrates been at least six feet, he might have been at least six feet
and one Planck length, and likewise for other heights. Boundedness will be true if, for
example, had Socrates been at least six feet, he would not have been at least a hundred
feet. Heights is just the trivial observation that had Socrates been at least six feet and
one Planck length, he would thereby have been at least six feet, and likewise for other
heights.
To stage our paradox, we are going to use a relatively weak counterfactual logic that
David Lewis (1973) callsV and that we will call B3. This system is strictly weaker than
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the full systemVC that Lewis accepts.1
The language of B3 is the language of classical propositional logic, extended with a
pair of two-place sentential operators and. 𝐴 𝐵 says that had it been that
𝐴, it would have been that𝐵. 𝐴 𝐵 says that had it been that𝐴, it might have been
that 𝐵.
We are here going to constructB3 as a Gentzen-style sequent calculus.2 This means
that the system has both rules andmetarules. Rules have the form
𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 ⊢ 𝐵 (1)
where 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 and 𝐵 are sentences of the object language. Such rules are called
sequents. (1) can be read as saying that if you accept all the sentences on the left of the
turnstile, then you must accept the sentence on the right. Metarules have the form
𝜎1, … , 𝜎𝑛
𝛾 (2)
where 𝜎1, … , 𝜎𝑛 and 𝛾 are rules rather than sentences of the object language. (2) can
be read as saying that if you accept all the rules on the top, then you must accept the
rule on the bottom.
B3 is constructed by extending classical logic with two basic metarules and several
basic rules.3 These are:
Substitution:
𝐴 ⊣⊢ 𝐴∗
𝐴 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴∗  𝐵
Weakening:
𝐵 ⊢ 𝐵∗
𝐴 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴 𝐵∗
Identity: ⊢ 𝐴 𝐴
Import: 𝐴 𝐵 ∧ 𝐶 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶
Conjunction: 𝐴 𝐵, 𝐴 𝐶 ⊢ 𝐴 𝐵 ∧ 𝐶
Disjunction: 𝐴 𝐶, 𝐵 𝐶 ⊢ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶
Strengthen Might: 𝐴 𝐶, 𝐴 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶
Duality: 𝐴 𝐵 ⊣⊢ ¬(𝐴 ¬𝐵)
The new metarules are Substitution and Weakening. Substitution says that we can
replace the antecedent of a counterfactual with any sentence that is logically equivalent.
1. Lewis refers to B3 asC0 andVC asC1 in his earlier (1971).
2. Lewis axiomatizes B3 as a Hilbert-style system. For another Hilbert-style axiomatization, see my
(2021).
3. By classical logic, I mean the system LK, which was introduced by Gentzen in his (1935). For more
on LK, see Paoli (2013).
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Weakening says that we can replace the consequent with any sentence that it logically
implies.
The first two rules are Identity and Import. Identity says that every sentence
counterfactually entails itself. Import says that we can import a conjunct from the
consequent into the antecedent.
The next two rules are Conjunction and Disjunction, which have a kind of symme-
try.4 Conjunction says that we can conjoin the consequents of any two counterfactuals
that share an antecedent. Disjunction says that we can disjoin the antecedents of any
two counterfactuals that share a consequent.
The last two rules are Strengthen Might and Duality. Strengthen Might is a rule
for strengthening antecedents.5 Duality says that there is a certain equivalence between
would and might counterfactuals.
As we observed earlier, Lewis accepts all the basic rules of B3. In addition, he also
accepts:
Counterfactual Modus Ponens: 𝐴, 𝐴 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐵
Weak Centering: 𝐴, 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴 𝐵
Strong Centering: 𝐴, 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴 𝐵
Adding these rules toB3 results in the full systemVC that Lewis accepts. None of these
rules, though, will play any role in our paradox. We will thus continue to focus on the
weaker system B3.
Once we have these basic rules and metarules of B3, we can derive two further non-
basic rules, which will help to simplify and structure our discussion.
Swap: 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶 ⊢ 𝐵 ∧ 𝐴 𝐶
Limited Transitivity: 𝐴 𝐵, 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶 ⊢ 𝐴 𝐶
Swap follows from Substitution. It says that we can always reorder conjuncts in the
antecedent of a counterfactual. LimitedTransitivity follows from Identity, Disjunction,
Conjunction, Weakening, and Substitution. It says that we can chain together certain
counterfactuals to infer others.
With our premises and counterfactual logic in place, we can now prove6 a flat
4. Conjunction is sometimes called Agglomeration.
5. StrengthenMight is sometimes called Rational Monotonicity.
6. B3 is a sequent calculus. But sequent proofs can be hard to follow, so we will generally use informal




1. 𝑠𝑗  ¬𝑠𝑘 Boundedness
2. 𝑠𝑗  𝑠𝑗+1 Tolerance
3. 𝑠𝑗 ∧ 𝑠𝑗+1  ¬𝑠𝑘 1, 2, StrengthenMight
4. 𝑠𝑗+1  𝑠𝑗 Heights
5. 𝑠𝑗+1 ∧ 𝑠𝑗  ¬𝑠𝑘 3, Swap
6. 𝑠𝑗+1  ¬𝑠𝑘 4, 5, Limited Transitivity
This reasoning is paradoxical because it can be iterated. After 𝑘 − 𝑗 − 1 applications
we have:
𝑠𝑘−1  ¬𝑠𝑘 (3)
But Tolerance tells us that
𝑠𝑘−1  𝑠𝑘 (4)
which gives us a flat contradiction by Duality. So something has to go: We must either
reject one of the premises or reject one of the rules or metarules. Call this the paradox
of counterfactual tolerance, or just the tolerance paradox for short.
2 Premises
The tolerance paradox has two major premises, which are Tolerance and Boundedness.
Should the paradox be resolved by denying one of them?
Boundedness says that some height has a counterfactual bound, where 𝑚 is a
counterfactual bound of 𝑛 when 𝑠𝑛  ¬𝑠𝑚. Denying Boundedness thus means
accepting that had Socrates been taller, he might have been any height whatsoever.
But any height whatsoever? Surely not. Even if Socrates had been taller, the Spartans
would not have thrown their weapons into the sea. But if Socrates might have been any
height whatsoever, this is simply false. Had Socrates been taller, he might have been a
thousand feet. But had Socrates been a thousand feet, the Spartans would have thrown
their weapons into the sea. Who wants to oppose the Great Giant of Athens? This
illustrates a general problem: If we deny that counterfactuals are bounded, so many
would counterfactuals will turn out false that we might as well give up counterfactual
reasoning altogether.
Two more observations about Boundedness. First, Boundedness says that some
height has a counterfactual bound. It does not say that all heights have a counterfactual
bound. Sufficiently outlandish heights might still be unbounded. Second, bounded-
ness does not require there to be a height with a least counterfactual bound. If it did,
there might be some concern that vagueness will result in indeterminacy. But since
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Boundedness only requires there to be a height with some counterfactual bound, these
concerns can be sidestepped.
If we cannot deny Boundedness, perhaps we should deny Tolerance. Denying
Tolerance means accepting the existence of singularities, where a singularity is any
height 𝑛 for which ¬(𝑠𝑛  𝑠𝑛+1).
As it turns out, there are certain reasons to accept singularities. First, suppose that
you accept Strong Centering. Suppose also that Socrates is exactly𝑛 Planck lengths tall,
which is to say that:
𝑠𝑛 ∧ ¬𝑠𝑛+1 (5)
But then by Strong Centering and Duality:
¬(𝑠𝑛  𝑠𝑛+1) (6)
The actual height of Socrates thus turns out to be a singularity, given Strong Centering.
You might also accept singularities because you accept certain bridge principles
connecting necessity, possibility, and counterfactuals. For example, consider the
following rule, with the diamond and box expressing metaphysical possibility and
necessity.
Modal Constraint: 3𝐴,2𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴 𝐵
Suppose that 𝐴 is metaphysically possible and 𝐵 is metaphysically necessary. Given
Modal Constraint, it then follows that had it been that 𝐴, it would have been that 𝐵.
Now suppose that there is a necessary limit to the height of Socrates. That is,
suppose that there is some 𝑛 such that 2(¬𝑠𝑛). Given the Law of Excluded middle,
there is then some 𝑘 such that:
3(𝑠𝑘) ∧ 2(¬𝑠𝑘+1) (7)
This 𝑘 is what youmight call the least possible upper bound on the height of Socrates.
Modal Constraint and Duality then tells us that:
¬(𝑠𝑘  𝑠𝑘+1) (8)
Thus, the least possible upper bound on the height of Socrates turns out to be a
singularity.
There are various ways that we could deal with such difficulties. We could deny
Strong Centering. We could denyModal Constraint. Fortunately, there is no need to
do either. Tolerance says that there are no singularities whatsoever. But this claim is
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stronger than needed. All we need is the weaker claim that there are certain intervals
within which there are no singularities.
Say that an interval [𝑗, 𝑘] is boundedwhen 𝑠𝑗  ¬𝑠𝑘 and tolerantwhen 𝑠𝑛 
𝑠𝑛+1 for every 𝑛 such that 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛 < 𝑘. An interval is paradoxical when it is both
tolerant and bounded.
All we need to generate the paradox is the existence of some paradoxical interval.
Moreover, that there are such intervals would seem to be obvious. For example, suppose
that Socrates is in fact five feet tall. The interval between six feet and ten feet would then
seem to be paradoxical. After all, had Socrates been at least six feet, he would not have
been at least ten feet. And for any height between six feet and ten feet, had Socrates been
at least that tall, he might have been at least a Planck length taller. Strong Centering is
no longer a problem, since five feet is strictly less then six feet. If there is a least possible
upper bound on the height of Socrates, it is presumably greater than ten feet. Thus,
Modal Constraint is also no longer a problem. So the interval between six feet and ten
feet would seem to be paradoxical.
What this shows is that to defuse the paradox by denying Tolerance, we need do
more than just accept the existence of singularities. We in fact need to deny that there
are, or even could be, any paradoxical intervals. But why would that be? Why must
every bounded interval include a singularity?
One response would be to simply assert that the rules and metarules used in the
paradox are correct. Thus, given Heights, logic itself guarantees that every bounded
interval has a singularity. And what better explanation could you want?
Maybe. But the plausibility of this response depends on the plausibility of the rules
and metarules, which in turn depends on whether there are simple and elegant views
on which they fail. In the second half of this paper, I will defend a view on which one
of the rules fails. Thus, I do not find this line of response convincing.
3 Duality
Duality says that would and might counterfactuals are duals. This rule is controversial,
and so you might wonder whether the paradox could be resolved by denying it. After
all, suppose that like Stalnaker (1968), you accept Counterfactual ExcludedMiddle:
CEM: ⊢ (𝐴 𝐵) ∨ (𝐴 ¬𝐵)
In that case, given Duality, it follows that
⊢ ¬(𝐴 𝐵) ∨ ¬(𝐴 ¬𝐵) (9)
But this is not correct. If a fair coin were flipped, it might have landed heads and, if a
fair coin were flipped, it might not have landed heads. Thus, those who accept CEM
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have good reason to deny Duality.
While theremaybe good reasons to denyDuality, doing sowill not solve the paradox,
and this for two reasons. First, even without Duality, we could use similar reasoning to
conclude that:
𝑠𝑘  ¬𝑠𝑘 (10)
This strikes me as obviously false. Thinking of 𝑘 Planck lengths as a hundred feet, this
says that had Socrates been at least a hundred feet, he would not have been at least a
hundred feet. Even worse, given Identity and Conjunction, this entails:
𝑠𝑘  ⊥ (11)
But surely not. Had Socrates been at least a hundred feet, the world would have been
very different. Maybe the laws of physics would have been different. Maybe the Great
Giant of Athens would have changed the course of geopolitical history. Still, however
things would have been, there would not have been true contradictions, nor would
there have been all the things that follow from true constrictions. There would not have
been square circles, married bachelors, even primes greater than two, and so on.
The other reason that denying Duality will not help is that we can distinguish
between strong and weak counterfactual operators. In English, we express the weak
would operator and the weak might operator. It is then an open question
whether these operators are duals. Suppose, though, that they are not. In that case, we
can introduce strong operators that are by definition duals of the weak operators.
𝐴 𝐵 ⊣⊢ ¬(𝐴 ¬𝐵) (12)
𝐴 𝐵 ⊣⊢ ¬(𝐴 ¬𝐵) (13)
The strong would operator 𝐴  𝐵 can be read as saying that it is false that had it
been that 𝐴, it might not have been that 𝐵. The strong might operator 𝐴 𝐵 can
be read as saying that it is false that had it been that 𝐴, it would not have been that 𝐵.
Once we have our strong operators, we can reformulate the paradox by simply
replacing the weak would operator with the strong would operator. Since the strong
would operator andweakmight operators are duals by definition, Duality is no longer a
problem. The reformulate premises are just as compelling. Boundedness, for example,
becomes the claim that there are 𝑗 < 𝑘 such that it is false that had it been that 𝑗, it
might have been that 𝑘. And this would seem to be correct: It is false that had Socrates
been at least six feet, he might have been at least ten lightyears. The reformulated rules




Limited Transitivity is compelling. For example, suppose that had it been sunny, it
would have been warm. Suppose also that had it been sunny and warm, Alice would
have gone for a run. From this, it would seem to follow that had it been sunny, Alice
would have gone for run. This is the sort of reasoning licensed by Limited Transitivity,
and would seem to be correct.
Besides being compelling in its own right, Limited Transitivity also follows from
other compelling rules and metarules. These include Identity, Conjunction, Disjunc-
tion, Weakening, and Substitution. In my own case, I accept all of these rules and
metarules, and so also accept Limited Transitivity.
That said, there are views on which Limited Transitivity fails.7 These are generally
views, though, on which Substitution holds. But so long as we have Substitution, we
can reason to paradox, even without Limited Transitivity.
To see why, note that we have said nothing about the logical structure of the
sentences 𝑠𝑛. For all we have said, they could be atomic sentences. Suppose, though,
that we let them be infinite disjunctions
𝑠𝑛 = 𝑝𝑛 ∨ 𝑝𝑛+1 ∨ 𝑝𝑛+2 ∨ … (14)
with each 𝑝𝑖 being an atomic sentence saying that Socrates is exactly 𝑖 Planck lengths.
In that case, the premises are just as compelling, but we can reason directly from line
three to line six using only Substitution.
Thus, we cannot block the inference from line three to line six by simply denying
Limited Transitivity. We would have to deny Substitution as well.8 But the cost of
denying both Limited Transitivity and Substitution is simply too great, or so it seems to
me. So we have reason to want a different solution.
5 Strengthen Might
This leaves us with few remaining options for resolving the paradox. We could try to
deny Heights. This would mean accepting that had Socrates been at least 𝑛 + 1 Planck
lengths, he might not have been 𝑛 Planck lengths. But how could that be? Moreover,
even if we were to deny Heights, we could reason from line three to line six directly
7. See for example Bacon (forthcoming) and Leitgeb (2012a, 2012b).
8. For a view on which Substitution fails, but Limited Transitivity holds, see Fine (2012).
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using Substitution, as we pointed out in the last section. Thus, denying Heights would
not even solve the basic problem.
Another option would be to deny Swap. All that Swap lets us do, though, is
rearrange the order of conjuncts in the antecedent of a counterfactual. But how could
rearranging conjuncts fail to preserve truth?
The only remaining option is to deny StrengthenMight. This, I think, is the right
solution. The secondhalf of this paperwill develop a positive viewonwhich Strengthen
Might fails. For now, we will just say a bit about what the rule says and why you might
accept it.
In classical logic, the antecedent of amaterial conditional can always be strengthened.
From the fact that 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐶, it follows that 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 ⊃ 𝐶 for any 𝐵 whatsoever. As Lewis
(1973) observes, though, the same is not true for counterfactuals. That is, the following
rule is not correct:
Strengthening: 𝐴 𝐶 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶
Suppose that had Alice gone to the party, she would have had a good time. From this, it
does not follow that had Alice gone to the party and learned that an asteroid was about
to destroy the earth, she would have had a good time. In fact, she most certainly would
not have.
The question then arises: If we cannot in general strengthen antecedents, then
under what conditions can we strengthen them? Lewis’s preferred system B3 gives
two answers. The first takes the form of a derived rule called StrengthenWould, which
follows from Conjunction and Import.
Strengthen Would: 𝐴 𝐶, 𝐴 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶
When 𝐴  𝐵, we will say that 𝐴 counterfactually entails 𝐵. What Strengthen
would tells us, then, is that we can strengthen an antecedent with any sentence that it
counterfactually entails.
The second answer takes the form of the basic rule StrengthenMight. Say that 𝐴 is
counterfactually consistent with 𝐵 when 𝐴  𝐵. In that case, what Strengthen
Might tells us is that we can can strengthen the antecedent of a would counterfactual
with any sentence with which it is counterfactually consistent.
Strengthen Would and Strengthen Might together represent a simple and elegant
theory of antecedent strengthening. The concern is that if we reject StrengthenMight,
we will be left with a theory that is not only less simple and elegant, but materially
inadequate. I think that this challenge can be met, and so we will return to this issue in
§12.
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6 Not the Sorites Paradox
At this point, you might be convinced that we have a paradox, but concerned that we
do not have a new paradox. Why is this not just the sorites paradox in disguise?
To build a sorites paradox, we need a scale and something like a vague predicate. We
might observe, for example, that one grain of sand is not a heap, but that a thousand
grains of sand is a heap. We then deny that there is a sharp cutoff between then number
of grains that do not form a heap and the number of grains that do. But in that case,
we can prove a contradiction using classical logic.
Now in the case of counterfactuals, we certainly can build a sorites paradox. We can
use heights as the scale and the counterfactual operators in place of a vague predicate.
The main observation, though, is that the resulting sorites paradox is not the tolerance
paradox. The arguments have different premises. They rely on different inference rules.
To construct a counterfactual sorites paradox, we can start by accepting Bounded-
ness. We then add two further premises:
Non-Triviality: For all 𝑛, 𝑠𝑛  𝑠𝑛.
No Sharp Cutoffs: For all𝑛 and𝑚,¬((𝑠𝑛  𝑠𝑚)∧¬(𝑠𝑛  𝑠𝑚+1)).
Non-Triviality says that had Socrates been at least six feet, he might have been at least
six feet, and likewise for other heights. No Sharp Cutoffs says that there is No Sharp
Cutoffs to how tall Socrates might have been. We can then use these premises to prove
a contradiction as follows:
1. 𝑠𝑗  ¬𝑠𝑘 Boundedness
2. 𝑠𝑗  𝑠𝑗 Non-Triviality
3. ¬((𝑠𝑗  𝑠𝑗) ∧ ¬(𝑠𝑗  𝑠𝑗+1)) No Sharp Cutoffs
4. ¬(𝑠𝑗  𝑠𝑗) ∨ ¬¬(𝑠𝑗  𝑠𝑗+1) 3, DeMorgans
5. 𝑠𝑗  𝑠𝑗+1 2,4 DS, EXP, DNE
The rules used on line five are Disjunctive Syllogism, Explosion, and Double Negation
Elimination. This reasoning is paradoxical because, after repeated application, we get
𝑠𝑗  𝑠𝑘, which is equivalent to ¬(𝑠𝑗  ¬𝑠𝑘) by Duality. But this contradicts line
one, so we have a paradox.
We can now observe several important differences between the two paradoxes.
The first is that while the sorites paradox requires No Sharp Cutoffs, the tolerance
paradox does not.9 The two paradoxes thus require different premises. They also
require different inference rules. The tolerance paradox requires substantial rules of
9. We know this because we can build models in which the premises of the tolerance paradox are all
true, but No Sharp Cutoffs is false. For one such model, see §11.
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counterfactual logic like Strengthen Might, Limited Transitivity, and Substitution.
The sorites paradox does not.10 Going the other direction, the sorites paradox uses
classical rules like DeMorgans, Disjunctive Syllogism, Double Negation Elimination,
and Explosion. These rules, though, play no role in the tolerance paradox.
Maybe you are willing to grant that the two paradoxes are not literally the same.
Still, you might think, there is a more general sense in which they depend on similar
reasoning, and so should be solved in similar ways.
For example, suppose you are a supervaluationist, and so think that vagueness is the
result of semantic indecision. Our semantic practice requires there to be a sharp cutoff
somewhere in the sorites series, but we have not yet decided where to draw it. You thus
accept that determinately, there is a sharp cutoff, but deny that there is a determinate
sharp cutoff. The sorites paradox then results from our tendency to conflate these two
claims. From the fact that there is no determinate cutoff, we tend to conclude that
determinately, there is no cutoff. Once these claims are distinguished, though, the
sorites paradox can be resolved, since we can reject No Sharp Cutoffs as determinately
false.
You might then say something similar about singularities. Suppose that we are
considering a particular bounded interval. You then say that our semantic practice
requires us to place a singularity somewhere, but we have not yet settled on where
to place it. You thus accept that determinately, there is a singularity in the interval,
but deny that there is a determinate singularity in the interval. The tolerance paradox
then arises because we tend to conflate these two claims. From the fact that there
are no determinate singularities, we tend to conclude that determinately, there are no
singularities. Once these claims are distinguished, though, the tolerance paradox can
be resolved, since we can reject Tolerance as determinately false.
I agree that a supervaluationist solution to the tolerance paradox should be on the ta-
ble. This kind of solution, though, will face all the challenges faced by supervaluationist
theories of vagueness, of which there are many.11
Moreover, even if you accept a supervaluationist theory of vagueness, there is not
the same motivation for accepting a supervaluationist theory of tolerance. The best
reason to be a supervaluationist about vagueness is that this lets us preserve classical
logic. But the correctness of classical logic is not at stake in the tolerance paradox. What
is at stake is the correctness of certain rules of counterfactual logic. These do not have
the same standing, and so rejecting them does not come at the same cost. There is thus
10. As formulated above, the sorites paradox does appeal to Duality, but this could be eliminated by
taking the dual of Boundedness as a premise.
11. See chapter five of Williamson (1996), for example.
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weaker motivation for adopting a supervaluationist theory of tolerance.
7 Towards a Solution
Lewis thinks that counterfactuals can be correctly modeled in terms of the relative
closeness of possible worlds. In particular, with the limit assumption in place, he
accepts:
Closest: 𝐴 𝐵 is true iff all of the closest 𝐴 worlds are 𝐵 worlds.
𝐴 𝐵 is true iff some of the closest 𝐴 worlds are 𝐵 worlds.
Here, an 𝐴 world is just a world at which 𝐴 is true. A world is among the closest 𝐴
worlds when it is an 𝐴 world and there are no other 𝐴 worlds that are strictly closer.
What can be shown is that if Closest is true, then B3 is sound and complete.12 But
in that case, the rules andmetarules used in the paradox are sound, and sowemust reject
one of the premises. Those of us who accept all of the premises, then, are committed
to rejecting Closest. But if Closest is rejected, what should be put in its place? The rest
of this paper will answer that question.
8 Burgess Models
There are different approaches tomodeling counterfactuals in termsof relative closeness.
Lewis (1971, 1973) uses systems of spheres. Stalnaker (1968) uses selection functions.
Here, we are going to use Burgess models, which are most general.13
Definition 8.1: A frameℱ = ⟨𝑊, 𝐿, ⪯⟩ consists of a non-empty domain of worlds
𝑊, a function 𝐿 assigning every world 𝑥 a local domain 𝐿𝑥 ⊆ 𝑊 of worlds, and a
function ⪯ assigning every world 𝑥 an accessibility relation ⪯𝑥 ⊆ 𝐿𝑥 × 𝐿𝑥.
Each world in a model has a local domain, which includes those worlds that are
counterfactually possible relative to that world. For every world, there is then an
accessibility relation on this local domain. When 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎, we say that 𝑏 is accessible
from 𝑎 relative to 𝑥. We can then use 𝑏 ≺𝑥 𝑎 as shorthand for 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 and 𝑎⪯̸𝑥𝑏 and
read this as saying that 𝑏 is strictly accessible from 𝑎 relative to 𝑥.
Definition 8.2: ABurgessmodelℳ = ⟨ℱ, 𝑉 ⟩ consists of a frameℱ and a valuation
function𝑉 assigning every atomic sentence 𝑝 ofℒ a denotation𝑉 (𝑝) ⊆ 𝑊. A sentence
12. Lewis (1971, 1973).
13. Burgessmodelswere introduced inhis (1981). For another interesting applicationofBurgessmodels,
see Field (2016).
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𝐴 is true at a world 𝑥 in a model ℳ when ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴, with this relation defined
recursively:
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝑝 iff 𝑥 ∈ 𝑉 (𝑝)
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ ¬𝐴 iff 𝑥 ̸⊧𝐴
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 iff 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 or ⊧ 𝐵
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 iff 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 and ⊧ 𝐵
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 𝐵 iff for every 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴 such that 𝑎 ∈ 𝐿𝑥, there is a 𝑏 ⊧ 𝐴
such that 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 and, for all 𝑐 such that 𝑐 ⪯𝑥 𝑏, if
𝑐 ⊧ 𝐴 then 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐵
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 𝐵 iff there is an 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴 such that 𝑎 ∈ 𝐿𝑥 and, for all 𝑏 ⊧ 𝐴
such that 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎, there is a 𝑐 such that 𝑐 ⪯𝑥 𝑏 with
𝑐 ⊧ 𝐴 and 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐵
Once we have truth at a world in a model, soundness and completeness in a class of
models is defined in the usual way. When a system is sound and complete in a class of
models, we will say that the class of models generates that system.
The class of all models generates a system that is too weak to be a realistic logic for
counterfactuals. After all, there are Burgess models in which Identity fails. But surely,
if there are any logical truths involving counterfactuals, one of them is that had it been
that 𝐴, it would have been that 𝐴.
To generate more realistic systems, then, we need to use smaller classes of models.
These classes are generally specified by placing constraints on accessibility relations.
Some common constraints are listed below.
Property Definition
Reflexive 𝑎 ⪯ 𝑎
Connected (𝑎 ⪯ 𝑏) ∨ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎)
Transitive (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑎)
Preorder reflexive, transitive
Total Preorder connected, transitive
Thequestionnow is, whichof these constraints shouldwe impose ifwewant to generate
the correct logic of counterfactuals?
9 Lewis
Lewis thinks that we should require accessibility relations to be total preorders. More
concretely, you might think of this as the view that we should require accessibility
relations to be as close relations.
What are as close relations? Imagine that you are standing in the middle of a grassy
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field. You are surrounded by several brightly colored balls at various distances. These
balls stand in as close relations, where 𝑏 is as close as 𝑎when the distance of 𝑏 is no greater
than the distance of 𝑎. Such as close relations are both connected and transitive, and so
form total preorders. Lewis, then, can be thought of as endorsing the view that a world
𝑏 is accessible from another world 𝑎 relative to 𝑥 if and only if 𝑏 is at least as close as 𝑎
to 𝑥.
The problem is that if we require accessibility relations to be total preorders, the
resulting class of models validates B3, and so validates all of the rules and metarules
used in the paradox. Thus, if we accept the premises, we cannot require accessibility
relations to be total preorders, and so cannot require them to be both connected and
transitive. One of those properties has to go.
10 Pollock
John Pollock (1975, 1976a, 1976b) thinks that we should require accessibility relations
to be preorders. Unlike Lewis, then, he denies that we should require them to be
connected, and so denies that we should require them to be total preorders. In terms of
distance relations, you might think of this as the view that counterfactual accessibility
relations are determinately as close relations.
Filling in the details a bit, you might think that the closeness of possible worlds is
determined by our modal practice. Our modal practice, though, is somewhat indeter-
minate. Thus, while possible worlds stand in as close relations on all precisifications,
our practice is compatible with many precisifications. A world 𝑏 is then determinately
as close as 𝑎 to 𝑥 when 𝑏 is as close as 𝑎 to 𝑥 on all precisifications.
Such determinately as close relations are reflexive and transitive, but need not be
connected. Thus, while determinately as close relations are always preorders, they need
not be total preorder. You might think of Pollock, then, as endorsing the view that a
world 𝑏 is accessible from 𝑎 relative to 𝑥 if and only if 𝑏 is determinately as close as 𝑎 to
𝑥.
If we require accessibility relations to be preorders, the resulting class of models
generates a system that we will call B1.14 That system can be axiomatized using the
same basic rules and metarules that we used to axiomatize B3. The only difference
is that Strengthen Might is simply deleted from the list of basic rules. Thus, since
Strengthen Might is not a correct rule in B1, Pollock would seem to have given us a
natural solution to the paradox.
The problem for Pollock is that while his proposal invalidates StrengthenMight, it
14. See Burgess (1981).
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also invalidates other rules we would like to keep. For example:
Distribution: 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶 ⊢ (𝐴 𝐶) ∨ (𝐵 𝐶)
Distribution says that we can always distribute a would counterfactual over a disjunc-
tion in the antecedent. So for instance, suppose that:
Had it either rained or snowed, Ophelia would have been pleased. (15)
Given Distribution, it then follows that at least one of the following is true.
Had it rained, Ophelia would have been pleased. (16)
Had it snowed, Ophelia would have been pleased. (17)
And this would seem to be correct. Pollock, though, is committed to the bizarre view
that this reasoning is invalid. By his lights, you can perfectly well accept (15) while also
rejecting both (16) and (17).15
Itmay beworthmentioning thatDistribution bears a passing resemblance to amore
controversial principle called Simplification.
Simplification: 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶 ⊢ (𝐴 𝐶) ∧ (𝐵 𝐶)
The difference is that where Simplification has a conjunction in the consequent,
Distribution only has a disjunction. Thus, if you accept (15), Simplification requires
you to accept that (16) and (17) are both true. Distribution only requires you to accept
that at least one is true.
11 Near Closeness
This brings us to my positive proposal for resolving the tolerance paradox. Rather than
requiring accessibility relations to be total preorders, as Lewis suggests, or requiring
them to be preorders, as Pollock suggests, I think we should require them to be
semiorders. More concretely, you might think of this as the view that accessibility
relations are nearly as close relations, rather than as close relations or determinately as
close relations.
What are nearly as close relations? Imagine again that you are standing in a grassy
field and are surrounded my several brightly colored balls. These balls stand in as close
relations. They also stand in nearly as close relations. A ball 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎 to
15. See my (2021) for a countermodel to Distribution.
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𝑥 when 𝑏 is no more than 𝑡 farther away than 𝑎 from 𝑥. The value of 𝑡 is what we will
call the tolerance margin.
So for example, suppose there is a blue ball that is three feet away and a red ball that
is four feet away. Suppose also that the tolerance margin is one foot. In that case, the
red ball is nearly as close as the blue ball, even though it is not as close as the blue ball.
Once we have nearly as close relations, we can define other useful relations. We will
say that 𝑏 ismuch closer than 𝑎when 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎 and 𝑎 is not nearly as close
as 𝑏. The distance of 𝑏 and the distance of 𝑎 is roughly equalwhen 𝑏 is nearly as close
as 𝑎 and 𝑎 is nearly as close as 𝑏.
So for example, suppose again that we have a one foot tolerancemargin. In that case,
one ball is much closer than another when it is more than one foot closer. The distance
of two balls is roughly equal when neither is more than one foot closer.
Like as close relations, nearly as close relations are connected. Unlike as close relations,
they are not transitive. After all, suppose that 𝑎 is three feet away, 𝑏 is four feet away,
and 𝑐 is five feet away. In that case, using a one foot tolerance margin, 𝑐 is nearly as close
as 𝑏 and 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎, but 𝑐 is not nearly as close as 𝑎.
While near closeness relations may not be transitive, they still satisfy a weaker
property that we will call semitransitivity.16
Semitransitive: (𝑑 ≺ 𝑐) ∧ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ≺ 𝑎)
(𝑑 ≺ 𝑐) ∧ (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ≺ 𝑎)
(𝑑 ⪯ 𝑐) ∧ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ≺ 𝑎)
Semitransitivity is the conjunction of three conditions. The first says: Suppose that 𝑑 is
much closer than 𝑐, that 𝑐 is much closer than 𝑏, and that 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎. In that
case, it follows that 𝑑 is much closer than 𝑎. The other two conditions are then similar,
except that the pattern ofmuch closer and nearly as close relations in the antecedent is
permuted.
When a relation is connected and semitransitive, it forms a semiorder. What the
above discussion shows, then, is that nearly as close relations are always semiorders, they
need not be total preorders or even preorders.
Mypositiveproposal is thatwe should require accessibility relations tobe semiorders.
Since nearly as close relations are semiorders, you might think of this as the view that
accessibility relations are nearly as close relations. Thus, 𝑏 is accessible from 𝑎 relative
to 𝑥 when 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎 to 𝑥. The result is that when the limit assumption is
in place, Closest is replaced with a different principle:
16. Candeal, Induráin, and Zudaire (2002) call this property generalized pseudotransitivity.
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Near Closest: 𝐴  𝐵 is true iff all of the nearly closest 𝐴 worlds are 𝐵
worlds.
𝐴  𝐵 is true iff some of the nearly closest 𝐴 worlds are
𝐵 worlds.
A world is among the nearly closest 𝐴 worlds when it is an 𝐴 world and there are no 𝐴
worlds that are much closer.
If we require accessibility relations to be semiorders, the resulting class of models
generates a system that we will call B2.17 This system is the result of adding two basic
rules to B1. The first is Distribution, which was described earlier. The second is
Diamond,whichwill be describe shortly. B2 is strictly intermediate in strength between
Pollock’s B1 and Lewis’s B3.
The key observation is that StrengthenMight is not a correct inference ofB2. Thus,
if counterfactuals are correctly modeled by nearly as close relations, we have a solution
to the tolerance paradox.
That we do in fact have a solution can be shown by building a model in which the
premises are true at every world. To that end, let 𝑡 be any natural number. We then let:
𝑊 = ℕ
𝐿𝑥 = ℕ
𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 = {⟨𝑏, 𝑎⟩ ∣ (|𝑏 − 𝑥| − |𝑎 − 𝑥|) ≤ 𝑡}
𝑉 (𝑠𝑛) = {𝑥 ∣ 𝑥 ≥ 𝑛}
In this model, the domain of worlds is the set of natural numbers and each world has
the set of natural numbers as its local domain. You might think of each 𝑛 as a world in
which Socrates is exactly 𝑛 Planck lengths. We then assign accessibility relations using
𝑡 as the tolerance margin. Finally, we choose a valuation function that assigns each
atomic sentence 𝑠𝑛 to the set of worlds at which Socrates is exactly 𝑛 Planck lengths or
greater.
Several facts about this model can now be easily confirmed. First, Tolerance,
Boundedness, andHeights are all true at everyworld. Second, every accessibility relation
is a semiorder. Third, StrengthenMight fails in this model. Thus, StrengthenMight is
invalid in the class of all Burgessmodels whose accessibility relations all form semiorders.
Fourth and finally, No Sharp Cutoffs is false at every world. Thus, we can consistently
accept all the premises of the tolerance paradoxwhile rejecting themain premise driving
the sorites paradox.
17. See my (2021) for soundness, completeness, and decidability results.
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We said earlier that the basic rules of B2 include a rule called Diamond.18 That rule
may be unfamiliar, but can be derived inB3, and so is accepted by Lewis, among others.
Diamond: (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ¬𝐴) ∧ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐵) ⊢ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐷 ¬𝐴) ∨
(𝐷 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐷)
What is this rule telling us? Suppose that Alice had been given the choice between one
dollar, two dollars, three dollars, and one beer. Suppose also that:
Had Alice chosen either one dollar or two dollars, she would not
have chosen one dollar.
(18)
Had Alice chosen either two dollars or three dollars, she would not
have chosen two dollars.
(19)
What Diamond tells us is that in that case, at least one of the following is true.
Had Alice chosen either one dollar or one beer, she would not have
chosen one dollar.
(20)
Had Alice chosen either one beer or three dollars, she would not
have chosen one beer.
(21)
The reasoning here is complex, and I grant that its correctness is not completely obvious.
Nevertheless, I think that Diamond is in fact a correct rule of inference.19
12 Strengthen Easy
Suppose that had Alice flipped a coin, Margaux would have laughed. Suppose also that
had Alice flipped a coin, it might have landed heads. From this, it would then seem to
follow that had Alice flipped a coin that landed heads, Margaux would have laughed.
This reasoning would seem to be in perfectly good order and is an instance of
Strengthen Might. The question is, if the general rule is not correct, then why does
reasoning like this often seem to be correct? This section aims to answer that question.
Our modal practice includes not only counterfactuals, but also comparative
modals. These come in a variety of flavors but, for our purposes, we will focus on
claims of the form:
It could have as easily been that 𝐴 as that 𝐵. (22)
So for example, you might think that it could have as easily been that a fair coin was
flipped and landed heads as that a fair coin was flipped and landed tails. Or you might
18. I am calling this rule Diamond because, when thinking in terms of Burgess models, it expresses a
property that I call diamond directedness in my (2021).
19. For those skeptical of Diamond, there is another systemB1.1 that results from adding Distribution,
but not Diamond, to B1. That system is generated by the class of all interval orders. See my (2021).
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think it could have as easily been that there was life on Mars as that there was life on
Venus.
To regiment such claims, we will add a two-place operator ⊴ to our language. We
then read 𝐴 ⊴ 𝐵 as saying that it could have as easily been that 𝐴 as that 𝐵.
Once we have both comparative modals and counterfactuals on the table, there
is the question of how they are related. Lewis, for example, accepts the following
equivalence.20
𝐴 ⊴ 𝐵 ⊣⊢ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐴) ∨ (𝐵 ⊥) (23)
Given this, Strengthen Might is equivalent to another rule that we are going to call
Strengthen Easy.21
Strengthen Easy: 𝐴 𝐶, (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ⊴ (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶
Strengthen Easy says that the antecedent of a counterfactual 𝐴 𝐶 can be strength-
ened with 𝐵, so long as it could have as easily been that 𝐴 and 𝐵 as that 𝐴 and ¬𝐵.
If we follow Lewis and accept (23), there is no hope of accepting Strengthen Easy
while rejecting StrengthenMight. The two rules are simply equivalent. But while that
may be, I reject the right-to-left direction of (23). I thus accept Strengthen Easy while
rejecting StrengthenMight.
To show that the right-to-left directionof (23) fails, suppose that Socrates isℎPlanck
lengths tall and consider any 𝑛 > ℎ. Tolerance tells us that:
𝑠𝑛  𝑠𝑛+1 (24)
Which in turn entails:
𝑠𝑛+1 ∨ 𝑠𝑛  𝑠𝑛+1 (25)
The right-to-left direction of (23) then gives:
𝑠𝑛+1 ⊴ 𝑠𝑛 (26)
But this is false. Socrates could havemore easily been at least 𝑛 Planck lengths than at
least 𝑛 + 1 Planck lengths. It would not have beenmuch easier, but it would have been
20. See (Lewis 2001) pp. 52-6 and pp. 118-42. For further discussion of comparative modals and the
role they play in our modal practice, see Kment (2014).
21. More precisely, the rules are equivalent in any system that includes(23) and extends B1. The proof
is straightforward and so left to the reader.
19
easier.




Had Alice flipped the coin, Margaux would have laughed. Moreover, had Alice flipped
the coin, it might have landed heads. From this, it would seem to follow that:
𝑎 ∧ ℎ 𝑚 (29)
Had Alice flipped a coin that landed heads, Margaux would have laughed. This
reasoning seems to be correct. But why would that be if StrengthenMight is not itself
a correct rule of inference? The answer, I think, is that when we accept (28), we also
accept:
(𝑎 ∧ ℎ) ⊴ (𝑎 ∧ ¬ℎ) (30)
That is, we accept that it could have as easily been that Alice flipped a coin that landed
heads as that Alice flipped a coin that did not land heads. Using standard metarules,
Strengthen Easy entails:
𝐴 𝐶, 𝐴 𝐵, (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ⊴ (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶 (31)
What this rule tells us is that so long as we have (30) as a background assumption, we
can correctly infer (29) from (27) and (28). Since we often have such background
assumptions in place, this explains why many instances of Strengthen Might would
seem to be correct.
13 Burgess Models Again
If we are going to use Strengthen Easy to explain the apparent correctness of Strengthen
Might, then we need a way to simultaneously model counterfactual operators and
comparative modal operators. Moreover, we need to make sure that our models do
in fact validate Strengthen Easy.
Fortunately, we can do this using the Burgess models we already have. The first
observation is that every counterfactual accessibility relation ⪯ determines what you
might call a comparative accessibility relation ⪯∗. This is done with:
𝑏 ⪯∗ 𝑎 iff ∀𝑥(((𝑎 ⪯ 𝑥) ⊃ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑥)) ∧ ((𝑥 ⪯ 𝑏) ⊃ (𝑥 ⪯ 𝑎))) (32)
Thus, we can think of every Burgess model as assigning not only a counterfactual
accessibility relation to every world, but also a comparative accessibility relation to every
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world. These comparative accessibility relations can then be used to give the semantics
for our comparative modal operator.
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 ⊴ 𝐵 iff for every 𝑏 ∈ 𝐿𝑥 such that 𝑏 ⊧ 𝐵, there is an 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴
such that 𝑎 ⪯∗𝑥 𝑏
Strengthen Easy is then valid in the class of all Burgess models. The proof is straightfor-
ward, and so left to the reader.
Putting the idea somewhat more intuitively, suppose that we have assigned a nearly
as close relation to every possible world. We can then use these relations to give the
semantics for counterfactuals in the way already described. Something else we can do,
though, is use each nearly as close relation to determine a unique as close relation. Once
we have these additional as close relations, we can use them to give truth conditions for
comparative modal claims. In particular, it could have as easily been that 𝐴 as that 𝐵 if
and only if for every 𝐵 world, there is an 𝐴 world that is at least as close.
14 Three Coins
Boylan and Schultheis (forthcoming) have recently suggested a counterexample to
Strengthen Might. Since I think of the tolerance paradox as also being a kind of
counterexample to Strengthen Might, I want to close by saying a bit about how our
counterexamples differ.
The Boylan and Schultheis counterexample goes like this. Suppose that Alice, Billy,
and Carol flip three fair coins.22 The flips are simultaneous and causally independent.
Alice flips heads, Billy flips tails, and Carol flips heads. Now consider the following
claims:
Had Alice and Billy flipped the same, Carol would have flipped
heads.
(33)
Had Alice and Billy flipped the same, all three might have flipped
the same.
(34)
Had Alice and Billy and Carol all flipped the same, all three would
have flipped heads.
(35)
Boylan and Schultheis claim that (33) and (34) are true, but (35) is false. If so, then we
have a counterexample to StrengthenMight. Call this the coin counterexample.
The coin counterexample succeeds only if there are plausible uniform standards on
which (33) and (34) are true, but (35) is false. The problem is that I can find no such
22. Boylan and Schultheis use a more complicated example involving dice and cash payouts, but the
basic structure is the same.
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standards.
Say that a coin at a possible world is incongruent if it lands differently than it does
at the actual world. Now suppose that we use strict standards onwhich, had either𝑛 or
𝑚 coins been incongruent, 𝑛 coins would have been incongruent, when 𝑛 < 𝑚. (33)
and (34) are then true. The problem is that (35) is also true.
Alternatively, suppose that we use more tolerant standards. These could be stan-
dards on which, had either 𝑛 or 𝑚 coins been incongruent, then 𝑛 coins might have
been incongruent, so long as 𝑛 − 1 ≤ 𝑚. (34) is then true and (35) if false. The
problem is that (33) is false.
The counterexample arguably goes through if we accept Simplification and under-
stand 𝑥 and 𝑦 flipping the same as the disjunction of either 𝑥 and 𝑦 both flipping heads
or𝑥 and 𝑦 both flipping tails. After all, (33) and (34)would seem to be true. (35) is then
false since, by Simplification, it entails that had all three flipped tails, all three would
have flipped heads, which is clearly false.
The problem is that while these are uniform standards on which the coin coun-
terexample goes through, they are not plausible standards, since Simplification is not a
plausible rule of inference.
Suppose that Boundedness is true because, had Socrates been at least six feet, he
would not have been at least ten feet. From this, it follows that had Socrates been either
six feet or ten feet, he would not have been ten feet. But then by Simplification, it
follows that had Socrates been ten feet, he would not have been ten feet. This is false.
So Simplification is invalid.
Boylan and Schultheis and I agree that Strengthen Might is invalid. Why, then, is
it so hard to find plausible uniform standards on which the coin counterexample goes
through? The answer, I think, is Strengthen Easy. After all, given that Alice actually
flips heads and Billy actually flips tails, it would seem that:
It could have as easily been that Alice and Billy both flipped heads
as that Alice and Billy both flipped tails.
(36)
Since Carol actually flips heads and all three flips are independent, it should then follow
that:
It could have as easily been that Alice and Billy and Carol all flipped
the same as that Alice and Billy flipped the same and Carol flipped
differently.
(37)
But now given Strengthen Easy, (33) and (37) entail (35). Thus, plausible uniform
standards on which (33) is true and (35) is false would have to be standards on which
Strengthen Easy fails. This means that if Strengthen Easy is a correct rule of inference,
as I maintain, that would explain why there are no such standards.
Summing up, there are at least two important differences between the coin coun-
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terexample and the tolerance paradox. First, where the coin counterexample may or
may not depend on Simplification, Simplification is incompatible with the tolerance
paradox, since it is incompatible with Boundedness. Second, where the coin coun-
terexample would seem to require Strengthen Easy to fail, the tolerance paradox does
not. This is a nice feature because Strengthen Easy gives us an especially simple and
straightforward explanation of why instances of Strengthen Might often seem to be
correct, even if the general rule itself is not.
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